The upcoming, delayed, 6 th EU-AU summit is fast approaching against a backdrop of calls to ‘ reset ‘ the current structure of Africa’s long-standing relationship with the European Union (EU) . This summit is, ostensibly, a bookend to the recent renegotiations that reinforce this aspiration, including the completion of the post-Cotonou agreement and the adoption of the EU’s Comprehensive Strategy with Africa. At the same time, the summit potentially provides a new opening to revitalize a flailing strategic approach between the EU and African countries, institutions, and leaders.
Whether the key decisionmakers admit it or not, Africa-EU relationship is in crisis . Not too long ago, the ruling junta in Mali kicked out the French ambassador , aware that France holds the presidency of the EU Council and is thus hosting the upcoming summit, and in spite of existing relations. The relationship is not at ease. It would be simple to write-off this particular diplomatic incident as unique; an alternative reading though is that it mirrors the crisis: European actors including the EU institutions or its member states articulate their preferences as if it works for all their interlocutors, the African perspectives whether valid or not, are dismissed as invalid. The situation with Mali is especially ironic not the least because the EU developed a military training mission in the country after which the same army perpetuated a coup that side steps EU’s prized norms of democracy and accountability. All the while, France has pushed an increasingly militarized agenda in that particular region of the continent, which too proved to be counterproductive to democratic controls . It is not just Mali though. In Burkina Faso , Guinea and other conflicts in Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria among others, where the EU has ostensibly prioritized peace and security what is instead evident are profound disappointments. The outcomes of EU’s peace and security engagements in Africa reinforcewhy Africa-EU relations must change .
Reset, Rethink, Retreat
Africa-EU relations is as old as European integration itself. The formalization of this relationship through a series of conventions, a continental strategic framework and sub-regional strategies have all prioritized peace and security alongside other policy areas. This relationship however has been defined by a constant hierarchy that has invariably subordinated African priorities even when there have been mechanisms for partnerships. Indeed, peace and security is an area where such partnership showed the most promise, since African decisionmakers and institutions had greater knowledge of the lay of the land as it were, even if the EU had the resources. This was the basis for the peace and security arrangement first devised in the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES), where peace and security were framed and accepted as an area of mutual interest and essential cooperation.
Yet, this is not matched up in the reality. The global peace and security landscape is increasingly tumultuous , and Africa is no exception. And from recent coups , to ‘ third-termism ‘ and conflicts at the national and community levels there are many contexts within which African citizens are unsafe despite this peace and security partnership framework. This is especially unfortunate since Africa has been the main testing ground for the emergence of the EU as a security actor. Whereas European security analysts have often criticized its lack of strategic autonomy as a hindrance to its full evolvement as serious actor, in Africa, the EU has managed to deploy large missions that deal with a range of themes like peacebuilding, maritime security, security assistance, and counter terrorism.
These missions however often function to serve European interests over a partnership that is mutually beneficial in the long term. Moreover, the increasing militarization through bilateral engagements with governments over regional aims compromise holistic understandings and practices of security . This gap undermines what everyday security looks like for Africa’s citizens. Indeed, there is frustration on both sides that despite the handwork of many, the latest waves of undemocratic transitions and conflicts reveal that peace is far from embedded .
The internal EU decision to shut down the African Peace Facility, which supported African visions of peace support, to then introduce the European Peace Facility (EPF), has been a source of rancour. While this allows the EU to assert its own strategic autonomy in ‘hard’ security areas, it undermines the agency of African peace and security actors to determine their priorities in peace and security. This challenges the mantra of partnership. As one analysis suggests , this unilateral move on the part of the EU has the potential to remove AU oversight of African peaceand security priorities and further weakens attempts at deepening continental peace integration. Thus, in parallel to these growing frustrations with respect to peace and security, the EU’s insistence on prioritizing its own modes of engagement over African priorities has made other actors more attractive . From the African side, there is a perception that African perspectives are derided – this is particularly evident in the discourses around the securitization of migration . The current state of affairs is thus not ideal for the partnership.
For good or for bad, a new dawn?
As the summit draws near, peace, security and governance are only one set of issues on the agenda; and it is perhaps the most significant. The summit is thus an important opportunity to push for change on three fronts . First, to follow through on the promise of partnership, control around what priorities need attending in Africa should be determined by African decisionmakers , no doubt with advice and support from their EU counterparts.
Second, a reversal of the ideology of militarism is essential. Whereas militarism serves the individual interests of some African elites, rather than Africans, it is also enabled by the EU’s recent approach to security on the continent contrary to regulatory commitments to peace. Third and finally, whereas the extent of the challenges currently comparing the global and African regional security landscape privilege traditional notions of peace and security, focusing on this aspect only is unsustainable. Both the African and European sides have the opportunity to rethink security in a holistic manner leveraging the commitments to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), for example. Moreover, greater engagement with a diversity of civil society representations, particularly of diaspora communities in Europe, and the most marginalized can yield creative options for making citizens of Africa and Europe safe. And if this is not the ultimate aim of these high-level meetings, what is?
The article first appeared on ISPI
