Integrating refugees and asylum seekers into host communities remains a major challenge for Kenya despite previous attempts, especially for those refugees living in camps. Focussing solely on refugees tends to attract a backlash from Kenya’s refugee-hosting communities who live in remote areas and grapple with their own development and humanitarian needs. To deal with the challenge of an extended refugee crisis in impoverished regions, the Kenyan government has proposed a new model – dubbed the Shirika Plan – in collaboration with United Nations Refugee Agency, the UNHCR.

Globally, a sustained, viable solution to forced displacement remains elusive even as the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide continues to grow. According to UNHCR estimates, there were 117.3 million forcibly displaced people as at the end of 2023. Of this total, 37.6 million are classified as refugees under international law, which defines a refugee as someone who leaves their home country and lives abroad out of a genuine fear of persecution. Ranking fifth in Africa and thirteenth globally in terms of global refugee burden-sharing, Kenya plays a critical role as one of the primary refugee-hosting nations.

Currently, the country is home to some 774,000 officially registered refugees and asylum seekers who have been displaced by ongoing wars and civil conflicts in neighbouring countries, including South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia, among others. Historically, with support from the international community delivered under the auspices of the UN’s Refugee Agency, Kenya has focussed on the immediate humanitarian need to protect and ensure their safety from physical harm. Yet as refugees establish themselves, it becomes evident that physical protection alone is not sufficient in the face of their growing needs, particularly in terms of access to social and economic resources within an already impoverished hosting environment.

In response, the Kenyan government has implemented a plethora of legislative, regulatory, and policy changes in partnership with the UNHCR to find long-term solutions to the refugee crisis. These reforms aim to level up the limited humanitarian and development spaces for accommodating refugees and asylum seekers. The most notable is Kenya’s widely known Refugee Act (2021), which became effective in February 2022. The Refugee Act, a comprehensive body of laws and regulations, opens up an otherwise restricted area so that refugees can, at least in principle, work, find employment, travel, and operate businesses.

Building on this progressive legal and regulatory oversight, other development bodies have also proposed and implemented initiatives and policies in partnership with the Kenyan government and the United Nations. The twin initiatives of the Kalobeyei Integrated Socioeconomic Development Plan (KISEDP) and the Garissa Integrated Socioeconomic Development Plan (GISEDP) are two examples. Both initiatives aim to fully integrate refugees into Kenyan society with potentially far-reaching social and economic prospects both for the refugees and the host communities.

The yet to be implemented Shirika Plan (formerly christened the Marshall Plan in reference to the United States’ extensive post-World War II reconstruction initiatives in Europe) aims to achieve the socioeconomic integration of refugees into host communities by converting refugee camps into integrated settlements. It is thus a society-wide strategy to address the issues raised by Kenya’s protracted displacement crisis. The integration of refugees is expected to lessen their reliance on foreign humanitarian aid and on the government, while also helping them to become self-reliant and enhancing both the host communities and Kenya’s expanding economy. The plan is aligned with the goals of both KISEDP and GISEDP and will be based mainly in Dadaab in Garissa County and in Kakuma-Kalobeyei Turkana County.

The plan is two-pronged. First, it establishes a strategic direction that defines a common goal and a methodical approach to converting refugee camps into integrated towns. This component includes a financial plan as well as a coordinated framework between the Kenyan government and the development and humanitarian organisations, among other participants in the refugee ecosystem. Secondly, the plan includes an implementation matrix that lays out a systematic approach, the costs associated with each task, and the deadlines for converting the plan’s objectives into real outcomes.

To achieve the ambitious goals of the Shirika Plan will necessitate the involvement of non-traditional players such as the World Bank, which in 2018 conducted its first market analysis research (“Kakuma As a Marketplace”) and found that the region has a thriving US$56 million market with over 2,000 enterprises in continuous operation. More recently, the Bank furthered its refugee-based investment thinking by conditioning the disbursement of the KSh158 billion loan to Kenya on the implementation of the Shirika Plan and the related policy provisions.

Although this investment acts as an incentivising device in a traditionally isolated space, the World Bank’s gesture has raised concerns within some sections of Kenyan society as to which priorities matter to the Bank – the refugees or the development needs of Kenya as a struggling, developing economy. More generally, the Shirika Plan has elicited debate among various groups; on the one hand, the plan is viewed as revolutionary and a solution to longstanding refugee problems such as lack of jobs, education, healthcare, and business opportunities. On the other hand, the plan is criticised for failing to address the root causes of the refugee crisis and for its potential to ignite conflict between hosts and refugees competing for socioeconomic and political resources.

The arguments on both sides have merit given that the majority of refugee-hosting nations are in the Global South and many face particular development challenges. As a result, they frequently feel overburdened by a refugee crisis that makes demands on their already scarce resources, with their populations frequently failing to recognise the need to put the survival and prosperity of refugees ahead of their own. In a recent private chat at a refugee forum, a well-placed government civil servant said, “This Shirika Plan is hard to grasp. Does this imply that refugees and I will have the same rights, and if so, for what duration?” These kinds of worries are common and frequently made worse by a lack of a well-thought-out awareness-raising strategy – a goal that the Shirika Plan has emphasised in its staged interventions.

However, Kenya has a moral and legal imperative to be an accountable, trusted and reliable partner in refugee governance. The first of its kind, particularly in terms of its multifaceted structure, the Shirika Plan is a rare opportunity for Kenya as an international leader in moral and normative terms. Additionally, there are broader economic rewards to reap, such as the improved social and economic development witnessed in Turkana and, to a lesser extent, in Garissa’s vibrant entrepreneurial spirit. Recent economic and infrastructural developments in northern Kenya – a region that has been historically underdeveloped – demonstrate the potential presented by the well laid-out Shirika Plan.

Improved road networks and communication facilities in places like Lodwar and Lokichogio in recent years, and Kakuma’s rate of urbanisation, are an indication of the value of refugees even in regions that the national and local governments might neglect for various political and economic reasons. In Dadaab and its environs, the Shirika Plan will likely build upon the refugee-host relations, which have been friendlier given the region’s predominantly Somali population.

Contrary to popular belief often driven by a lack of access to accurate information (as evidence in Kenya and elsewhere reveals), the employment of refugees and their involvement in other income-generating activities contribute to the host country’s economic prosperity. The situations prevailing in Dadaab and Kakuma demonstrate that, from an economic perspective, the host can benefit from the consumption patterns of refugees that would otherwise not have materialised. Moreover, the presence of refugees can contribute significantly to the labour supply for local companies, particularly in Africa’s informal economies. Also, improved refugee-host relations can be achieved through a well-crafted integration strategy, which also saves the government and its allies millions of shillings by preventing tensions and clashes like those recently witnessed in Turkana’s semi-integrated Kalobeyei arena.

Nonetheless, these potential opportunities have to be underpinned by the current humanitarian and socioeconomic realities in Kenya. The implementation approach must be grounded in evidence and built upon experiences consistent with international standards.

First, as Alastair Ager and Alison Strang observe, the operationalisation framework should prioritise taking into account the minimum domains of integration, which comprise “means and markers” (access to jobs, education, and health), “social connections” (social bridges, social bonds, and social links), “facilitators” (safety and stability, language and cultural knowledge), and “foundation” (rights and citizenship). This is an essential prerequisite considering the diversity and variations apparent among Kenya’s refugees and their hosts.

For example, the Shirika Plan would profit from integration scenarios like those in Niger and in Uganda that have operationalised domains of the integrative framework. The latter offers an excellent example of state-led and internationally co-funded refugee-host integration due to a greater level of refugee engagement and participation in the host country, particularly with regards to a free land policy. In the former case, improved information campaigns have aided in lowering host-refugee animosity.

Second, the integration framework should be designed to balance the concerns of both the refugees and the host communities. Incorporating the opinions, concerns, and needs of both hosts and refugees into the integration process is vital for the government and other stakeholders to attain this balance. Historical flashpoints such as land and other shared resources, and the anticipated benefits envisioned in the plan will require a high degree of attention. For instance, perpetual disputes between the Turkana hosts and the refugees in Kakuma over the ownership and sale of firewood as well as the question of land ownership in light of the increased prospects for refugee farming would need to be carefully considered. Better and more educative awareness campaigns concerning the entrepreneurial possibilities for Somali refugees in Dadaab are unavoidable. One such campaign may be a multifaceted effort to refute the previous political discourse that portrayed them as terrorists.

Third, the long-term integration framework plan should consider a viable citizenship regime guaranteeing the socioeconomic freedoms and political rights of refugees. While the status of refugee in an integrated system offers certain guarantees, an individual is still limited with regards to the particular rights attached to citizenship. Therefore, granting national citizenship is the most durable and often the most desirable long-term solution for a person wishing to discard the refugee status. This can be achieved through policies that enable refugees to interact with and learn about Kenya’s national culture, and have stimulating contacts with the host populations.

The status of refugee should not be indefinite but should have a timeframe because, as integration deepens, refugees will demand a say in Kenya’s political dispensation because, as potential taxpayers, they will be more interested in issues of accountability and transparency as well as in matters of electoral democracy. We anticipate that refugees will not stop at economic and social freedoms but will ultimately demand political inclusion as a right.

In conclusion, the successful implementation of the Shirika Plan and refugee integration in general hinge heavily on the determination of the government and other development actors to address this protracted humanitarian issue. Indeed, notwithstanding the obstacles associated with the execution of the Shirika plan, ample prospects exist for the Kenyan government and its development partners, as well as for the refugees and the host communities. Achieving a more profound, meaningful integration plan as envisioned depends not only on the economic benefits of integrating refugees and hosts but also on taking into account present and future social-political rifts and fissures. The host communities and the refugees should, therefore, be engaged with regards to the kind of integration they wish to see.

 

Authors

Matai Muon is a development scholar, and an incoming doctoral student of International Development at Oxford with research interests straddling refugee governance, policy and the political rhetorics of…

Dr Fred Nasubo, PhD, is a Lecturer at Taita-Taveta University and Author of Branding Kenya: Identity and Image.