When Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed made peace with Eritrea in 2019 just one year after taking office-and won the Nobel Peace Prize for doing so-outsiders would have been forgiven for anticipating improved regional stability. Yet Abiy, challenged with maintaining control over Ethiopia’s culturally diverse regions and addressing economic woes, has attempted to elevate Ethiopia’s regional influence and to distract from internal discontent by adopting a nationalist and hawkish foreign policy. This has exacerbated friction in the Horn of Africa, where Ethiopia’s foreign policy has now taken center stage.
On Aug. 12, Turkey hosted the foreign ministers of Somalia and Ethiopia for a second round of talks aimed at breaking the impasse following Addis Ababa’s surprise January memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, the semi-autonomous breakaway region in Somalia. The agreement, in which Ethiopia would acquire a naval and commercial base near Berbera in exchange for recognizing Somaliland, drew vocal international criticism, and the United States, European Union, China and the African Union all voiced support for Somalia’s sovereignty.
While there are clear economic incentives driving Ethiopia’s assertive posturing, much of it is wrapped in nationalistic sentiment. For instance, Abiy has proclaimed that “Ethiopia’s existence is tied to the Red Sea,” while making it clear that he wants Ethiopia to become a naval power. He expressed this ambition as early as 2018, indicating he isn’t just interested in sea access to diversify Ethiopia’s trade. He has stressed the significance of the sea access Ethiopia enjoyed in the three decades following Addis Ababa’s annexation of post-colonial Eritrea in 1962, before losing it again in 1993 .
The agreement with Somaliland not only strained Ethiopia’s relations with Somalia but also has wider implications for the power dynamics in the Horn of Africa. Despite initial fears of confrontation, Ethiopia’s willingness to engage in further talks before implementing the agreement demonstrates Abiy’s awareness of international pressure. Reactions to the Turkey-hosted talks were mixed. On one hand, Ankara portrayed the talks as a success, with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan citing “notable progress,” and a third round of talks was agreed upon for Sept. 17, fueling some cautious optimism over resolving the dispute.
On the other hand, the Ethiopian and Somali foreign ministers, Taye Atske Selassie and Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, respectively, didn’t even meet face-to-face and instead liaised through Fidan. And the mood after the negotiations seemed to indicate that neither side was willing to budge on their
Somalia has repeatedly insisted that its territorial sovereignty is a red line, with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud proclaiming on Aug. 17 that Mogadishu would not hold further talks until Ethiopia “recognizes the sovereignty of Somalia.” Mogadishu fears that Somaliland’s independence would weaken its security and ability to deal with threats like Al-Shabaab. Tensions have since persisted. On Aug 22, Mogadishu threatened to suspend Ethiopian Airlines flights to Somalia, while later stating it would oppose Ethiopia’s participation in the African Union Support Mission in Somalia unless it suspends its agreement with
Even in the event of further diplomacy, Somalia’s concerns will almost certainly prove a major hurdle for negotiations, and the deal may also heighten regional tensions. Already, Djibouti is fearful that Ethiopian access to Somaliland’s coast could damage its heavily port-dependent economy.
Many Ethiopians already feel that Abiy has failed to deliver on promises he made when he came to power, so making concessions abroad would be a domestic blow for Abiy.
On Aug. 14, just two days after the talks, Somalia signed a defense pact with Egypt, its fellow Arab League state, signaling its intent to align with Cairo to help send a message of deterrence to Addis Ababa.
The pact further aligns Cairo against Addis Ababa after a disputebetween the two countries over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, or GERD, along the Nile River. The dam dispute remains unresolved, and the dam’s construction is more than 95 percent complete.
The next phase involves electromechanical work to reach its full capacity, but it has already started generating electricity. Egypt has warned that restrictions to the Nile’s flow are a matter of life and death for the nation, but Abiy’s insistence on maximizing Ethiopia’s usage of the water has prevented a legally binding agreement to regulate downstream flows to Cairo.
As with his efforts at regaining sea access, Abiy has used nationalistic rhetoric to champion the GERD, stating in September 2023 as the dam made progress that “our national perseverance against all odds has delivered.” He also previously asserted “that no force could stop Ethiopia from building a dam,” highlighting the escalatory risks of the dispute with Egypt.
Given the economic and political challenges Abiy faces at home, he is unlikely to back down from his assertive posturing. Many Ethiopians already feel that Abiy has failed to deliver on promises he made when he came to power, so making concessions on the Somaliland agreement and the GERD would be a domestic blow for Abiy, and put his government in an even more precarious political position.
In addition, Ethiopia is still reeling from the Tigray war. While a ceasefire was brokered in November 2022 following African Union mediation, the situation remains unstable as Ethiopian troops continue to periodically crack down on local militias and commit violence against civilians in the Amhara region, among other regional states.
The Tigray war has had astronomical costs for the nation and its people, resulting in an estimated 600,000 dead and causing upwards of $28 billion in economic losses and damages.
Indeed, both the Tigray war and the COVID-19 pandemic have battered Ethiopia’s economy in recent years. In July, the government ended three decades of economic orthodoxy by removing its fixed currency exchange rate to secure an IMF bailout worth $3.4 billion, open the door for more financing from the World Bank and attract more private sector investment into the country.
While this policy could bolster the nation’s economic fortitude in the long term, it also poses clear short-term risks and could lead to further domestic discontent. Ethiopia’s annual rate of inflation was already 18.60 percent as of July 2024, and the Ethiopian Birr quickly fell about 30 percent against the U.S. dollar in the wake of the decision to float the currency. Similar economic reforms have recently lead to protests in other countries across Africa, such as in Kenya and Nigeria.
Tensions in the Horn of Africa, already blighted by the war in Sudan, have spotlighted the lack of leadership in the region. Through the lens of counterterrorism, the U.S. has seen Abiy as a useful partner and has been less attentive to the domestic and regional repercussions of the Tigray war. The IMF bailout may further consolidate a perception in some quarters that the United States has been too soft on Abiy.
For now, the leadership vacuum is being filled by countries striving for increased influence in the region, particularly Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
The African Union may also play a role in mediating regional disputes, given its previous success in mediating an end to the Tigray war. However, as long as Abiy maintains his assertive foreign policy, particularly with regard to his naval ambitions, and continues to risk aggravating the volatile situation within Ethiopia’s own borders, the region will face an uncertain future.
Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a British analyst and journalist whose work has focused largely on Gulf Cooperation Council affairs, as well as geopolitical and economic issues pertaining to the wider Middle East and Indo-Pacific.
The post first appeared World Politics Review.
